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Editorials
With this number of the Journal a practice is
inaugurated of publishing editorial comments
upon controversial subjects in the field of criminal
law, criminology, police science, and police administration.
Upon some occasions one of the editors, or an
editorial consultant, will present an issue and express his own views upon it; at other times the
initiative may come from writers not associated

with the Journal. In either event an opportunity
will always be afforded for responsible response.
The response, however, must fall within the space
confines of editorial comment.
Following is an expression of a viewpoint by the
Journal's Editor-in-Chief that will unquestionably
draw opposing comment-very likely from one or
more of the Journal's own editorial consultants.

"PLAYING GOD": 5 TO 4
(The Supreme Court and the Police)
Over the past several years, whenever the
Supreme Court of the United States rendered a decision that imposed a new restriction upon the
police, many persons were heard to say: "If only
the police, prosecuting attorneys, the organized
bar, the state courts, or the legislatures had taken
the initiative and done something about the situation there would have been no need for the Court
to step in." To some of us this always seemed to
be a naiv6 explanation of the motivation of a
majority of the Justices.
Recent developments have established, to my
satisfaction, the fact that the Court's majority has
been determined all along to do its own policing of
the police regardless of what any other group or
any other branch of government might do by way
of attempting to solve the law enforcement problems about which the Court has been so concerned.
The Court's one man majority was going to continue to "play God". And "play God" it did in its
June, 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona (384

U.S. 436).
For the past several years an American Law
Institute committee, composed of lawyers, law
teachers, and judges, with divergent viewpoints
upon the subject, has devoted a tremendous
amount of time and effort toward the formulation
of a proposed tentative legislative code prescribing
interrogation procedures for the police to follow.
These endeavors of the American Law Institute

began a year before the Court's 5 to 4 decision of
June, 1964 in Fscobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S. 478),
and the tentative draft of the Committee's proposed code had been printed and disseminated at
least three months before the Miranda decision.
As the Institute's committee was working on its
project, so was a comparably composed American
Bar Association Committee on Minimum Standards of Criminal Justice. One of its sub-committees
had been assigned to deal specifically with the
police interrogation problem and to make recommendations, and it was working closely with the
Institute's committee toward that end. Its existence and activities were also known to the Court
long before the Miranda decision.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice
was also deeply engaged in a study of many aspects
of criminal investigation that inevitably would have
produced facts and figures helpful to a full consideration of the interrogation-confession problem.
And other studies were under way, such as those
by the District of Columbia Crime Commission
and the Georgetown Law Center. Also, the Ford
Foundation had recently awarded a grant of
$1,000,000, in part, for a study of arrests and confessions in New York.
Here, then, was action-in truly democratic
fashion-seeking to find a proximate solution to
some very difficult problems.

EDITORIAL

All of these efforts would have resulted in a full
airing of the interrogation-confession problem,
based upon practical as well as legal considerations.
But a one-man majority of the Court in Miranda
"pulled the rug" from underneath all of these
studies and research groups, and effectively foreclosed a final evaluation of their ultimate findings
and recommendations. It did so by branding as
unconstitutional a substantial segment of the very
practices and procedures that were under consideration by these various groups. As Justice
Harlan said in his dissenting opinion in Miranda,
"the legislative reforms" that may have emanated
from such group efforts "would have had the vast
advantage of empirical data and comprehensive
study" and "they would allow experimentation
and use of solutions not open to the courts". Also,
in Justice Harlan's opinion, "they would restore
the initiative in criminal law reform to those forums
where it truly belongs".
With its Miranda limitations upon the validity
of a suspect's waiver of the Court's newly conceived "rights" about which he must be informed,
there will be many instances where police investi-
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gators are deprived of an essential means for the
solution of a substantial percentage of the serious
crimes that now plague this country. Only by a
deliberate evasion of the Miranda rules might the
police prevent this consequence; and this they
should not do! Legally, as well as morally, the
police have no alternative but full and good faith
compliance. Whatever deleterious effects their
compliance may bring with respect to the safety
and security of law abiding citizens do not constitute a responsibility with which they should concern themselves. To use the words of one of the
Supreme Court Justices in another context, "There
are others who must shoulder much of that responsibility".
Considering the complexity of the interrogationconfession problem, a summary 5 to 4 nullification
of much of the aforementioned group efforts directed toward the preparation of legislative guidelines is awesomely inconsistent with fundamental
democratic concepts.
It's more like "Playing God: 5 to 4".
FRED E. INB,,mAu,
Editor-in-Chief.

